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This study discusses European Commission’s recent proposal to combat VAT fraud by taxing 
intra-Community supplies at a common rate of 15%, accompanied by the internal correction 
of input-tax gap between an importer and his own national tax authority, which is caused by 
the national VAT rate differing from 15%. It attempts to put this proposal into perspective by 
linking it to the overall aims of value added taxation in Europe and by comparing it to other 
alternative mechanisms examined in the literature. Especially issues of bilateral VAT revenue 
clearing between EU countries, which arise from the Commission’s proposal, are highlighted. 
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1   Introduction 
According to the basic principle of the EU VAT Directive, the common EU VAT regime 
should ideally be neutral concerning the origin of goods and their stage of production or 
distribution, so that a single market which guarantees fair competition can be realised. At 
the same time a business in the EU which has a full right to deduct should be unaffected 
by the taxation of intra-EU trade, and would apply the same principle to cross-border pur-
chases as it does to domestic ones, and pay the VAT due to its supplier and reclaim this as 
input tax on its VAT return. 
Despite the introduction of the single market and the abolition of border controls in 
1993, the destination principle still applies for the cross-border trade between firms in the 
EU, which are taxed with the zero-rate.
1 Since 1993 the member states must monitor the 
proper rebate of VAT credits for intra-EU supplies to and the proper payment of VAT on 
intra-EU acquisitions from other members by checking the books of registered enter-
prises.
2 Apart from the compliance asymmetry – the different VAT treatment of domestic 
and cross-border supplies – which cause non-symmetric compliance costs, the prevailing 
transitional VAT system has been criticised since the deferred payment system breaks the 
VAT chain at the borderline of domestic and foreign tax administration (European Com-
mission 1996; Lockwood, de Meza and Myles 2005). It was expected that such weak-
nesses in VAT control would be exploited by VAT frauds, given the fact that in the EU 
there has always been a permanent and huge flow of commodities which circulate free of 
VAT after the export VAT rebate in the exporting country has been granted and before the 
deferred VAT payment in the importing country becomes effective (see also Genser 2003; 
Cnossen 2008b).
3 “Goods allegedly destined for export (at which prior stage VAT had 
been refunded) might be re-imported and diverted to the shadow economy, and imported 
goods (which would leave another member state free of VAT) might not be included in 
                                            
1   The Draft Directives of 1987 and 1989 which stipulated VAT rate bands and revenue distribution through 
cross-border VAT crediting in conjunction with a tax clearing mechanism did not find unanimous support 
in the European Council. For this reason, such a transitional VAT system was then implemented by the 
Directives 91/680/EEC and 92/77/EEC. Yet the origin principle applies to the direct imports of house-
holds, although for some specific cases (including household purchase of cars) the destination principle 
still prevails. In addition an EU-wide minimum VAT standard rate of 15% was introduced. 
2   In this context VAT identification numbers were introduced to identify registered business from other 
member countries, and firms were obliged to provide detailed information on the intra-EU trade under the 
VAT Information Exchange System and Intrastat system. 
3   In 2006 with over two and a half million businesses across the EU, intra-EU purchases reached over 
€2,400 billion. In addition, for the majority of member states the value of intra-EU supplies of goods has 
recently accounted for around 10% to 20% of their total supplies (European Commission 2008).   3
the importer’s VAT return. [Even more seriously], a chain of artificial transactions from 
the import to the export stage could be created resulting in net VAT funds being paid 
without VAT ever having been collected in previous stages, a phenomenon which goes by 
the name of carousel fraud” (Cnossen 2008a: p. 3). More precisely the carousel fraud – 
also called missing trader intra-Community (MTIC) fraud – takes place when “fraudsters 
register for VAT, buy goods [tax]-free from another member states, sell them on at VAT 
inclusive prices and then disappear without paying the VAT due” (Cnossen 2008a: p. 16). 
In order to solve the problems surrounding such carousel frauds caused by the break in 
the VAT-collection chain, several reform proposals for the future European VAT system 
have been made in the literature (Bird and Gendron 2000; Genser 2003). According to the  
viable integrated VAT (VIVAT) recommended by Keen and Smith (2000), for example, a 
common Euro-VAT rate is imposed on all the business-to-business (B2B) cross-border 
supplies between the EU member states (the so-called exporter rating), whereas a national 
retail sales tax is charged on sales to final consumers. Since the Euro-VAT rate is the same 
throughout the EU, a multilateral clearing can be used to fill the revenue gaps caused by 
the difference between intra-EU supplies and acquisitions of the individual countries. 
However, such a uniform exporter rating does not provide the solution of problems related 
to “the break in the VAT-audit trail. Importing member states would still not be able to 
audit importers’ invoices (received from exporters in other member states) for which they 
have no authority. This would provide a powerful incentive to fake importers’ invoices, 
showing VAT eligible for credit instead of no VAT as under the current regime” (Cnossen 
2008a: p. 9). 
As an option of the ‘more far-reaching measures to tackle VAT fraud’, the European 
Commission (2008) suggests a taxation of intra-EU supplies of goods at the common EU 
minimum VAT rate of 15%, which resembles very much the VIVAT.
4 Yet, the Commis-
sion’s reform model is additionally equipped with the internal correction of input-tax gap 
between the company that made the cross-border acquisition and the tax authority within 
the same country, which is caused by the difference between the national and the common   4
EU VAT rates. This extra feature not only compensates the weakness of the VIVAT re-
garding the auditing problems of importers’ invoices mentioned above but also makes the 
input-tax reimbursement possible according to the VAT rate and the deduction rules of 
destination country.
5 
This study attempts to put this proposal into perspective by linking it to the overall aims 
of value-added taxation in Europe and by comparing it to other alternative mechanisms to 
tax intra-Community trade as described in the literature. In particular this study focuses on 
the issues of bilateral revenue VAT clearing between EU member states, which would 
take place on the basis of a micro-model of firms’ trade declarations.
6 
The study is structured as follows. Following this introductory part, Section 2 illus-
trates, based on a simple two-country model endowed with a single firm and household, 
the scope of VAT revenue clearing caused by the introduction of the origin principle on 
the B2B intra-EU supplies under the additional consideration of different VAT regimes 
(including a full switch to the origin principle and VIVAT). Section 3 describes the novel 
and distinct features of the European Commission’s latest reform proposal in the same 
model framework and examines its advantages and shortcomings compared to the current 
transitional system and other previous VAT reform proposals. The final section summa-






                                                                                                                                   
4   Regarding the European Commission’s idea of changes in the current VAT systems as a possible option 
to combat against the VAT fraud, either through a generalised reverse-charge system where liability for 
VAT payments would be shifted from the supplier to the purchaser, or by taxing intra-Community sup-
plies of goods, “the ECOFIN Council of 5 June 2007 also expressed the view that the preferred system of 
taxing intra-Community supplies should be based on taxation in the member states of departure and not 
in [those] of arrival … [and] noted also that a majority of member states expressed reservations about the 
optional generalised reverse-charge mechanism …” (European Commission 2008: p. 4), in which the li-
ability for VAT is shifted from suppliers to purchasers of taxable goods and services. 
5   However, this reform approach would still provide an incentive to produce false import invoices through 
‘third countries’ in order to qualify for a tax credit.   5
2   Revenue clearing in different European VAT systems 
A switch from the destination to the origin principle applied to the intra-EU supplies 
would cause VAT revenue changes in the individual EU countries. In order to correct such 
VAT revenue imbalances among the member states and to guarantee neutrality, a clearing 
mechanism is necessary. In the following it is assumed that there are two countries, A and 
B, and that each country has a (registered) company and a household. The intra-EU trade 
takes place between company A and company B, which consists of export volume of XA 
(from A to B) and XB (from B to A), while XA > XB. Then in country B the imported XA is 
further sold to household B without any value added made by the domestic company B. 
The same process occurs with XB in country A. The (standard) VAT rate imposed on these 
‘domestic’ sales amounts to tA in country A and tB in country B, while tA > tB > 0. 
 











                                                                                                                                   
6   According to the European Commission (2008), EU countries would become dependent on each other for 
around 30 billion euros of VAT revenue – approximately 10% of total receipts. The Netherlands, Ger-
many, Belgium and Ireland would emerge as the largest net contributors to the clearing system. For the 
bilateral micro-clearing, there are three options for gathering such microeconomic data: collection by 
means of (i) the normal VAT declaration, (ii) a monthly recapitulative statement with global amounts for 
customer/supplier, and (iii) a monthly recapitulative statement at invoice level by suppliers and purchas-
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As illustrated in Figure 1, the B2B cross-border supplies are tax free in the present transi-
tional regime. Moreover, in country A the final consumption of the imported goods from 
country B (XB) bears the VAT burden with an own tax rate of A (tA). Consequently, when 
the destination principle prevails, the total VAT revenue for government of country A 
amounts to 
 
TA,DES = tA·XB          (1) 
 
Analogously for government B the following applies: 
 
TB,DES = tB·XA       ( 2 )  
 
Under the origin principle, treating domestic and intra-EU sales alike, exports from coun-
try A to country B (XA) are subject to tA and initially generate VAT revenue for govern-
ment A amounting to tA·XA (see Figure 2). In addition, the final consumption of the im-
ported goods from country B (XB) bears the VAT burden with tA in country A. Yet com-
pany A is entitled to deduct the VAT sum paid to company B (tB·XB) when importing the 
volume of XB from country B, and such VAT credits are granted in the destination country 
A. 
The total VAT revenue for government A now amounts to 
 
TA,ORI = tA·XB + (tA·XA – tB·XB) = TA,DES + (tA·XA – tB·XB)   (3) 
 
In a similar way one can also yield for government B  
 
TB,ORI = tB·XA – (tA·XA – tB·XB) = TB,DES – (tA·XA – tB·XB)   (4) 
 
Movement from the destination to the origin principle alters the level of VAT revenues of 
the individual countries A and B. Since tA·XA > tB·XB, a clearing of the total amount of 
(tA·XA – tB·XB) should take place between government A and government B in order to 
safeguard the revenue neutrality. 
 
   7













Under the VIVAT, a common EU VAT rate (t* > 0) is imposed on the B2B cross-border 
supplies between country A and B based on the origin principle, while sales to domestic 
customers (i.e. household A and B) are subject to the national VAT rate (i.e. tA and tB). In 
this framework company A can claim, for example, EU VAT credits on intra-EU acquisi-
tion from company B (t*·XB) from government A, while company B can claim t*·XA from 
government B. 
Consequently, when the VIVAT is implemented, the total VAT revenue for government 
A reaches 
 
TA,INT = tA·XB + t*·(XA – XB) = TA,DES + t*·(XA – XB)     (5) 
 
while for government B the following applies: 
 
TB,INT = tB·XA – t*·(XA – XB) = TB,DES – t*·(XA – XB)     (6) 
 
As expressed by equation (5) and (6), the introduction VIVAT should also be accompa-
nied by a clearing system in which the total sum of t*·(XA – XB) would be transferred from 
  Country A  Country B 
VAT rate = tA 
Exports are subject to tax
Household A  Company A
Government A





 (1+tA)·XA (1+tB)·XA  (1+tA)·XB 
 




   tA·XA–tB·XB 
Clearing according to destination principle
VAT rate = tB 
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government A to government B. In the context of such a cross-border fiscal transfer, reve-
nue neutrality is ensured for both countries (see Figure 3). 
 














3   European Commission’s VAT reform proposal with a bilateral 
clearing 
In the following the major features of the European Commission’s VAT reform model are 
introduced in more detail based on the same two-country model framework. The current, 
transitional VAT system remains basically applicable except where specified differently 
below. Company A (or company B) making an intra-EU supply charges, at a common rate 
(t*) of 15%, VAT to his counterpart in another EU country. As is the case in most member 
states the standard VAT rate tA and tB are assumed to be larger than t*. Therefore  
 
tA > tB > t* where t* >   0       ( 7 )  
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VAT rate = tA* 
Exports are subject to tax t*
Household A  Company A
Government A
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Tax flow Trade flow  9
Yet, in order to guarantee the neutrality of the system the purchasing company declares, in 
cases where the country is not entitled to deduct the VAT in full, an intra-EU acquisition 
in the country of arrival (destination) and accounts for the VAT difference that occurs, 
either positive or negative, between t* charged on the operation and the domestic rate ap-
plicable in that country. In this context a type of (internal) input tax clearing takes place 
between the company and the government within the same country. In our example shown 
in Figure 4 such correction amounts to (tA – t*)·XB for company A, while the sum reaches 
(tB – t*)·XA for company B. 
The purchaser is now entitled to deduct the VAT he has paid to his supplier and the 
VAT he has accounted for because of the rate difference via the VAT return and according 
to the right-of-deduction rules of the country of arrival (“internal clearing”). As a conse-
quence, company A can deduct tA·XB (= t*XB + (tA – t*)·XB), while for company B the sum 
amounts to tB·XA (= t*XA + (tB – t*)·XA). Under all circumstances the purchaser needs to 
have an invoice from the supplier before being allowed to exercise his right of deduction.
7 
Hence, the VAT revenue for government A now amounts to 
 
TA,EC = tA·XB + t*·(XA – XB) = TA,DES + t*·(XA – XB)     (8)  
 
while for government B the following applies: 
 
TB,EC = tB·XA – t*·(XA – XB) = TB,DES – t*·(XA – XB)     (9) 
 
Since TA,EC > TA,DES and TB,EC < TB,DES, a (cross-border) bilateral clearing mechanism is 
again necessary between the involved member countries to ensure that the VAT receipts 
accrue to the country where the intra-EU acquisition has taken place. As the case with the 
VIVAT, the sum of t*·(XA – XB) should also be transferred from government A to govern-
ment B in this integrated reform model, aimed at achieving revenue neutrality. 
Ceteris paribus when t* becomes lower, the aforementioned internal input-tax clearing 
within a country occurs in a larger scale, while the member states’ revenue dependency on   10
the cross-border clearing sum declines. Under the condition t*=0, that is equivalent to the 
application of destination principle, or XA = XB, no bilateral clearing mechanism is neces-
sary between the involved countries A and B. 
 














With this reform proposal the European Commission has shown its intention to lay aside 
its preference for compliance symmetry and tolerate the different tax treatment of domes-
tic and intra-EU supplies within an integrated transitional VAT system. The introduction 
of exporter rating to the intra-EU supplies with a common EU minimum VAT rate of 15% 
additionally equipped with the internal correction of input-tax gap between an importer 
and his own national tax authority, which is caused by the national VAT rate differing 
from the common rate of 15%, can be seen as an improvement of the VIVAT. This extra 
                                                                                                                                   
7   In other words, linking supply and acquisitions listings is a crucial prerequisite for the success of this 
reform model, which is also necessary to respond to the inherent risk of deduction without a correspond-
ing payment. “As a further step, and [also …] to minimise the number of mismatches between these list-
ings, it could be an option to change the rules governing the time the tax becomes chargeable, and to link 
it entirely to the issuing the invoice insofar as the VAT becomes due in any case if an invoice has not 
been issued within a certain period” (European Commission 2008: p. 5). 
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feature in the system would more effectively induce companies to declare their intra-EU 
acquisitions at home and reduce the possibilities of faking import invoices within the EU. 
In this context the member states would also be better able to collect microeconomic data 
required for the revenue clearing from taxable persons in the countries of departure and 
those of arrival of goods. However, such a supplement appears to make the entire VAT 
coordination more complicated, requiring higher compliance and administrative costs.  
Concerning the internal clearing mentioned above, the choice of the common EU VAT 
rate t* seems to be a critical matter. For instance, if t* is set much higher than the national 
VAT rate (say t* = 30%), the system would ceteris paribus provide stronger incentives for 
firms to declare their intra-EU acquisitions, since they would additionally get money back 
from their own national tax authority. Moreover, the dependence of VAT revenues in a 
form of transfers from foreign countries would increase, which would, however, make the 
individual countries more active in the improvement of tax administration and its cross-
border coordination in the EU. On the other hand, such a higher VAT on intra-EU supplies 
might induce traders to purchase lower-rated domestic commodities over high-rated im-
ports, even though the import VAT would be fully creditable and refundable, if required. 
The supranational (macro as well as micro) VAT revenue clearing system has been 
judged to be inappropriate for the purpose of VAT coordination in the EU (see also Gen-
ser 2003; Gebauer, Nam and Parsche 2005). Instead, a new concept of bilateral clearing 
system between the member states is recommended, following the subsidiarity principle. 
Apart from enhancing the incentive compatibility, this proposal more strongly underscores 
that VAT administration and revenue collection are exclusively a national matter. It also 
means that each country would be involved in 26 different bilateral clearing processes in 
the case that the number of member states remains unchanged. In other words, a total 
number of 351 bilateral clearings would take place in the EU 27 simultaneously. In this 
context, in addition to an intensive cooperation and information exchange between na-
tions, an EU-wide coordination and harmonisation of procedures and practices related to 
VAT administration, declaration, collection, monitoring, auditing, etc. appears to be still 
required in order to make the entire clearing mechanism more transparent and efficient 
(see also European Commission 2007). 
In order to justify the effectiveness and superiority of the VAT reform recommendation 
the European Commission should thoroughly evaluate benefits and costs related to its in-  12
troduction.
8 In particular the Commission should make it clear whether the potential to 
combat VAT fraud is worth the additional administrative costs and complications raised 
by the need for revenue clearing. The answer to this question will partly depend on the 
current extent of VAT fraud and on the extent to which this fraud can be eliminated by the 
proposal. In this context, it should be borne in mind that the recent Commission’s VAT 
reform model primarily targets the prevention of carousel fraud. Yet there are other types 
of VAT fraud including (i) shadow economy fraud, (ii) suppression fraud, (iii) insolvency 
fraud and (iv) bogus traders (Cnossen 2008a).
9 According to the data collected by Cnossen 
(2008a), the ‘shadow economy’ and the ‘artificial tax avoidance (including insolvency 
fraud)’ were the major reasons for VAT revenue losses in Germany, comprising shares of 
ca. 50% and 21% of total revenue losses for the period 2001-02, while the carousel fraud 
amounted to around 10% in the same period of time. In the UK, the share of total VAT 
revenue loss caused by the carousel fraud was estimated to be around 12% for 2006-07, 
indicating the fact that the VAT revenue loss associated with the carousel fraud is only a 
fraction of the total VAT frauds committed in the individual EU member states. 
Repeatedly, an important prerequisite for the implementation of such a bilateral clear-
ing is that the discrepancy between the total intra-EU imports and exports made by the two 
involved countries should in essence be zero, which would be derived on the basis of 
firms’ intra-EU trade declarations. Yet, according to the European Commission (2008), 
the total amount of excess of total (recorded) intra-EU imports over exports reached ap-
proximately €80 billion in 2006 in the EU. The reasons for such a mismatch also “include 
the level of estimation by member states of non-submitted returns; errors on the returns; 
threshold under which statements are not required; territorial issues; and the inclusion of 
goods for onward processing” (European Commission 2008: p. 14).  
One of the major reasons why the consideration of introducing supranational micro as 
well as macroeconomic clearings has been in vain is the failure of correct measurement of 
                                            
8   The major criticism of the introduction of the VAT reverse charge system in Germany was the large scale 
excess of anticipated short- and medium-term costs over the potential benefits (Gebauer, Nam and Par-
sche, 2007). 
9   The first type of VAT fraud generally comprises many individuals rendering various services tax-free, 
often by using and buying taxable inputs from their own or employer’s business. The second fraud type 
occurs typically when firms understate their sales or inflate their claims for VAT on purchases. The in-
solvency fraud takes place when firms buy taxable goods and sell them further at inflated prices, provid-
ing high tax credits to purchasers, but declare its insolvency without paying their VAT liabilities. In the 
case of the fourth type, fraudsters register for VAT, make false claims for input-tax reimbursement from 
the tax authority and then disappear (Cnossen 2008a).   13
the volume of intra-EU trade on the national level. Since clear information on tax rates in 
the member states prevails, the European VAT coordination including the movement from 
destination to origin principle would also be feasible if such high quality intra-EU trade 
data were available in the EU. To a large extent this would also be the result of the mini-
mised VAT evasion in the EU. In this context, Cnossen (2008a) correctly points out that a 
proper domestic and multi-jurisdictional audit aimed at better identifying the true intra-EU 
trade volume would well obviate the need for costly design change of VAT system, ac-
companied by reporting requirements, which might be more burdensome than those under 
the prevailing deferred payment. Moreover, the optimal exploitation of current legal and 
administrative cooperation arrangements made among member countries appears to be 
more effective in handling the cross-border VAT evasion than the implementation of a 
new reform model with the exporter rating. 
 
 
4   Conclusion 
This study examines the EU’s ongoing efforts aimed at searching for an efficient Euro-
pean VAT system that fits its single market concept. Unfortunately the previous attempts 
have been unable to achieve a satisfactory solution, which calls for a reopening of public 
discussions and policy actions on this matter in the EU. The European Commission’s re-
cent VAT reform model, applying the exporter pricing to the intra-EU supplies with a 
common EU minimum rate (15%), would compensate for the weakness of the deferred 
payment system which breaks the VAT chain and causes VAT fraud in a single market, 
and allows the different tax treatment of domestic and intra-EU supplies. The additional 
provision of an internal correction of the input-tax gap between an importer and his own 
national tax authority, which is caused by the national VAT rate differing from the com-
mon EU rate, would largely compensate for the weakness of the VIVAT: this novel fea-
ture would more effectively lead companies to declare their intra-EU acquisitions at home 
and reduce the possibilities of manipulating import invoices within the EU. Consequently 
the EU countries would also be better able to gather microeconomic data required for 
revenue clearing from taxable persons in both countries of departure and arrival of goods. 
However, apart from the incentives still provided for producing false import invoices 
through third countries, which are aimed at qualifying for a tax credit, the European Com-  14
mission’s reform approach is likely to make the entire VAT coordination more compli-
cated, requiring higher compliance and administrative costs. Moreover, the choice of a 
common VAT rate appears to be critical, since a higher common rate than the national one 
would encourage firms to declare their intra-EU acquisitions but lead them to buy lower-
rated domestic goods over higher-rated imports, while the national VAT revenues would 
become more strongly dependent upon the clearing system. 
Instead of a less-incentive supranational VAT revenue clearing system, a bilateral one 
is recommended on the basis of firms’ intra-EU trade declarations as mentioned above. 
Such a bilateral clearing method would further stimulate not only the member countries’ 
efforts aimed at enhancing their technical and organisational tax administration as well as 
revenue collection systems but also the EU-wide cooperation in the field of information 
exchange and harmonisation of VAT procedures. However, a challenging aspect is that 
each country would be involved in 26 different bilateral clearing processes simultaneously 
in the EU 27, a number which may grow gradually. 
In order to further examine the applicability of the Commission’s recent VAT reform 
recommendation, a thorough ex ante evaluation of benefits and costs related to its intro-
duction is necessary. Especially the Commission should make it clear whether the poten-
tial to combat VAT fraud is worth the additional administrative costs and complications 
raised by the need for revenue clearing. To be sure this will depend on the current extent 
of VAT fraud and on the extent to which this fraud can be eliminated by the proposal. In 
this context it should be repeatedly emphasised that the Commission’s reform model pri-
marily targets the prevention of carousel fraud and that the VAT revenue loss associated 
with this fraud type appears to be only a fraction of the total VAT frauds committed in the 
individual EU member states. Other types of VAT fraud like shadow economy fraud, sup-
pression fraud, insolvency fraud and bogus traders can hardly be tackled by this reform 
proposal. 
The failure of VAT coordination in the EU mainly originates from the failure of a cor-
rect measurement of the volume of intra-EU exports and imports on the national level. For 
example, a smooth movement from destination to origin principle would be feasible if 
high quality intra-EU trade data were available in the EU. Certainly this would also be the 
result of the minimised VAT evasion in the EU. In this context a proper domestic and 
multi-jurisdictional audit aimed at identifying the true intra-EU trade volume seems to 
obviate the need for a costly design change of VAT system, equipped with more burden-  15
some reporting requirements than those under the current deferred payment. Furthermore, 
the optimal exploitation of legal and administrative cooperation arrangements (in the 
fields of tax administration, declaration, collection, monitoring, etc.) made among member 
countries would eventually be more promising to handle the cross-border VAT evasion 
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